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ABSTRACT
The article follows Kant’s different views on aesthetics ranging from 
the pre-critical period to the Critique of the Power of Judgement. It 
argues that John Zammito’s psychological explanation of why Kant 
in the third Critique developed an argument for the transcendental 
justification of judgements of taste is unconvincing. As an alterna-
tive, the article shows how Kant in his published pre-critical dis-
cussions of aesthetics was relying upon empiricist sources while 
he in private comments turned to consider the culture critique of 
Rousseau. Kant’s preoccupation with questions of culture critique, 
it is argued, was an important reason to enlarge the doctrines of 
transcendental philosophy with a third Critique containing a tran-
scendental aesthetics of beauty. Additionally, it is pointed out an 
interesting similarity throughout the development of Kant’s philos-
ophy. In 1765 and in the third Critique Kant was concerned to keep 
philosophy and judgements of taste apart from science in order to 
argue that these were spaces for freethinking. 
KEYWORDS 
Kant, Aesthetics, Art, Culture Critique, Zammito, Freethinking.
In 1781, as Kant launched the system of transcendental philosophy 
in the Critique of Pure Reason, he criticized his fellow Germans for 
their use of the term aesthetics to denote “what others call the cri-
tique of taste.”1 According to Kant in Critique of Pure Reason and 
restated in the revised version of 1787 such use stemmed from “a 
failed hope” uttered by the “excellent analyst Baumgarten, of bring-
ing the critical estimation of the beautiful under principles of rea-
son, and elevating its rules to a science.” Rather, aesthetics should 
be understood in its original Greek meaning as a term designating 
the human ability to obtain sensory impressions. Kant proclaimed 
a system of transcendental philosophy in which the term aesthet-
ics was confined to the “transcendental Aesthetics,” a transcenden-
tal aesthetics that amounted to a transcendental demonstration of 
the pure forms of intuition, space and time. Hence, introducing 
the system of transcendental philosophy Kant denied all attempts 
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to connect aesthetics as judgements of taste with any principles 
of reason. He rejected Baumgarten’s endeavour as “futile” and 
stressed how the “putative rules or criteria [of taste] … are mere-
ly empirical as far as their sources are concerned, and can there-
fore never serve as determinate laws a priori according to which 
our judgement of taste must be directed, rather the latter consti-
tutes the genuine touchstone of the correctness of the former.”2 
Transcendental aesthetics understood as the pure forms of intui-
tion, space and time, Kant argued, made up an important element 
of the field of science and was exempted from any connection to 
judgements of taste. As merely empirical the judgements of taste 
stood outside the realm of principles of reason. 
In his pre-critical philosophy Kant also thought of judgements 
of taste as empirical. In the 1760’s he deemed all judgements of 
beauty to be based upon feeling and therefore thoroughly empir-
ical. Kant furthermore supposed judgements of taste to be analo-
gous to moral judgements. Both were based upon feelings and thus 
of empirical nature. In the small book Observations on the Feeling 
of the Beautiful and the Sublime from 1764 Kant explored the as-
sociative interconnections between feelings of beauty and the sub-
lime with moral feelings. The book was one of his most popular 
pre-critical books republished twice in 1766 and 1771. Kant’s point 
of departure was an anthropological and empirical generalization 
of the human being which led him to discuss feelings of beauty 
and the sublime as not only analogous to moral feelings but also 
to the nature of the human sexes. Accordingly, the feeling of beau-
ty was generally related to the female sex and the moral feeling of 
helpfulness, that is “the inclination to kindness.”3 The feeling of 
the sublime, on the other hand, was most often associated with 
the male sex and the feeling of true virtue based upon principles. 
These principles, Kant went on to explain, “are not speculative 
rules, but rather the consciousness of a feeling that lives in all hu-
man breasts … the feeling of the beauty and dignity of the human 
nature.”4 Though the sublime and the feeling of virtue were related 
to a kind of principle this should not be understood as if they were 
based upon independent principles of reason. Rather, all judge-
ments of taste and morals were reducible to natural feelings.
In the first Critique Kant completely reversed any such posi-
tive assessment of the empirical nature of judgements of taste and 
morals. Transcendental moral philosophy should be grounded on 
a principle of reason and, as we have seen, Kant scorned the at-
tempt to develop a philosophical aesthetics for its empirical ba-
sis. However, this was not his final conclusion. As Kant nine years 
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later, in 1790, published the Critique of the Power of Judgement it 
contained a complete revision of his view on judgements of taste. 
Kant only retained one element from his rather rejecting view in 
the first Critique, namely that there can be no science concerned 
with aesthetic judgements of taste. Nevertheless, Kant claimed the 
pure judgement of taste included a principle a priori. As such they 
should be considered part of the transcendental system of philoso-
phy – that is a part of the principles of reason. The special variety 
of the principles a priori in judgements of taste Kant called a “sub-
jective universal validity, that is the aesthetic, which is not based 
upon any concept.”5 
Judgements of beauty escaped the empirical realm albe-
it in the paradoxical form of having subjective universal validity. 
Accordingly, Kant believed the third Critique to be a completion 
of the system of transcendental philosophy without any increase 
of the doctrinal conceptions of philosophy as a science. The third 
Critique does not establish a further doctrine of philosophy apart 
from theoretical and practical philosophy. The pure judgements of 
taste form a genuine part of the philosophical system of principles 
a priori because they point to the functioning of reflective judge-
ment as an expression of reason. 
The paradoxical nature of the judgements of taste calls for fur-
ther explication. Just as puzzling are the several times Kant changed 
his mind about the nature of judgements of taste. Part of the answer, 
of course, lingers on the great shift in his philosophical outlook 
before and after the silent ten years dividing the pre-critical writ-
ings of Kant in the 1750’s and 1760’s from the system of transcen-
dental philosophy inaugurated by the first Critique in 1781. But this 
does not explain why Kant in the third Critique argued for a tran-
scendental foundation of judgements of taste after having discard-
ed judgements of taste as merely empirical in the first Critique. In 
the following a closer examination of Kant’s opinions about beau-
ty and the sublime in the pre-critical period is laid out in order to 
assess the philosophical achievement of Kant in the Critique of the 
Power of Judgement.
THE ELEGANT MAGISTER OF THE 1760’S 
In the 1760’s Kant was known in Königsberg for his distinguished 
style in manners as well as clothing. Friends and students approv-
ingly called him the elegant magister (der galante Magister) be-
cause of his stylishness. Just as important for his reputation was 
the fact that Kant introduced the intellectual circles of Königsberg 
to the new philosophical trends from Britain and France. Kant was 
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described as a man of elegance who impressed the social life of 
Königsberg with his intelligence, wit and tasteful habits. Concerned 
with his outer appearance he was said to have developed the maxim 
that it “was better to be a stylish jester than a jester with no sense 
of style.”6 As a man in his late thirties and early forties he would 
wear extravagant clothes such as jackets with gold embroidery and 
a ceremonial epee. 
This extravagance was only possible because Kant was an es-
teemed as well as hard working private lecturer (Privatdozent). It 
was usual that a private lecturer at the university would be teaching 
between 16 and 24 hours each week.7 Earning his living from the 
fees payed by the students attending his lectures, Kant – as all pri-
vate lecturers – would advertise for his teaching hoping his reputa-
tion combined with the exciting content of the courses could attract 
many paying students to his classes. Kant’s teaching advertisement 
for the winter semester 1765 has survived to our times. Here we can 
read that Kant keenly underlined that he was not teaching “philos-
ophy” but trying to convey to the students how to “philosophise.”8
Kant thought it possible to learn a science such as history or 
mathematics but not philosophy exactly because it did not have the 
format of a scientific discipline – what Kant later would call being 
a doctrine of science. Kant explained that a science can be learned 
because students can impress upon their “memory or understand-
ing everything which can be introduced as a complete discipline for 
us. In order to learn philosophy such a discipline should be ready 
at hand. It should be possible to point out a book and say: see here 
is wisdom and reliable insight … Until someone can show me such 
a book of wisdom that I can depend upon … I must be allowed 
to declare that it amounts to an exploitation of the communality 
[of the teaching of the universities] if he [the teacher of philoso-
phy] instead of broadening the ability of the entrusted youth to use 
their understanding … would run after them with a supposed ready 
world wisdom. … It is the method to think about things yourself 
and to judge for yourself that the student seeks [in philosophy] and 
which alone can be useful for him.” 
Kant’s statement is remarkable in itself. For our topic, it is 
even more interesting because, as will be argued in the conclud-
ing part of this paper, Kant’s understanding in 1765 of the meth-
od to learn to philosophise can be seen as analogous to what Kant 
finds is the transcendental achievement of the aesthetic judgements 
in the Critique of the Power of Judgement. We can detect a kind of 
congruence between Kant’s pre-critical understanding of the aims 
of teaching within the field of philosophy and his transcendental 
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justification of aesthetic judgements in 1790. But in the 1760’s 
Kant’s view on aesthetics was quite different as becomes evident 
from Kant’s pre-critical discussions of aesthetics. 
KANT’S EARLY AESTHETIC OBSERVATIONS 
According to Kant the Observations on the Feeling of Beauty and 
of the Sublime was not so much a contribution to philosophy as 
an accumulation of observations on the feelings of beauty and the 
sublime. Commencing the text Kant noted, “the impressions of 
pleasure or annoyance are not as much dependent upon the charac-
ter of external things that rouse these feelings, as upon the feeling 
in each individual human being, a feeling that stirs pleasure or dis-
pleasure.”9 This implied that “what for some gives rise to great de-
light is experienced as nauseating by others.” Aesthetic judgements, 
Kant thought, were relative to the individual and exempt from uni-
versality even though it is possible to observe general trends. Kant’s 
aim was to look closer at some of the more remarkable trends of 
beauty and the sublime and as such he underlined that the observa-
tions were conducted “more with the eye of the observer than the 
eye of the philosopher.” 
It is worthwhile to ponder on the title: Beobactungen über das 
Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen. As explained in the very first 
line of the book Kant thinks of beauty and the sublime as feelings 
stemming from the individual constitution of each human being. 
What the individual feels is beautiful is beautiful for her and there 
is no room for a discussion of the correctness of the individual feel-
ing. Furthermore, Kant plays with associations to other contempo-
rary philosophical works within the field of aesthetics. Already in 
1724, Francis Hutcheson had published a work entitled An Inquiry 
into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue. The book was 
translated into German in 1762. In 1757 Edmund Burke’s highly fa-
mous essay A philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of 
the Sublime and the Beautiful was published. Even though it was 
not translated into German until 1773 by Lessing, its content was 
available for the German reading public as early as 1758. That year 
Moses Mendelssohn published a thorough reception of Burke’s 
book in the journal Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften und 
der freyen Künste and his own aesthetic writings show discernable 
influence from Burke. So even though Kant was no fluent reader 
of English he was familiar with Hutcheson’s and Burke’s works. 
Kant’s title most strikingly alludes to these two well-known British 
philosophical essays. 
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According to Hutcheson the beautiful object contains objective 
qualities, which the individual is exposed to. Thus, if there is disa-
greement about beauty it mainly has to do with just how beautiful 
a thing is, not with whether or not it is beautiful at all.10 In order to 
argue for the objective quality of all beautiful objects Hutcheson 
assumes that beauty is perceived by “an internal sense [which] is 
a passive power of receiving ideas of beauty from all objects in 
which there is uniformity amidst variety.”11 Burke does not fol-
low Hutcheson in his perfectionist comprehension of the objec-
tive qualities of beauty nor the assumption of a specific sense to 
perceive beauty. Rather, he argues that judgements of taste are de-
veloped and improved “by extending our knowledge, by a steady 
attention to our object, and by a frequent exercise.”12 According to 
Burke judgements of beauty advance through experience of beauti-
ful objects and are based upon empirical sense experience. 
Hutcheson and Burke both define feelings as ideas exempted 
from inner impressions and thus identify beauty, the sublime and 
virtue with ideas. In 1764 Kant can be said to follow this under-
standing of aesthetic feelings. He proposes that the subjective feel-
ing aroused by impressions of pleasure or annoyance makes up the 
foundation of aesthetic feelings. In particular, Kant’s Observations 
display close resemblance to Burke’s philosophical aesthetics. In 
accordance with Burke Kant suggests that all judgements of taste 
are subjective and relative to the individual feeling aroused by in-
ner impressions. 
Even more obviously Kant echoes Burke’s explanation of the 
sublime as a negative experience of the great, which is turned into 
a feeling of pleasure by the subject. According to Kant the feel-
ings of beauty and the sublime both cause pleasant but very differ-
ent emotions. Kant explicates the difference by pointing out that 
“the sublime stirs and the beautiful allures.”13 This difference Kant, 
also in accordance with Burke,14 observes to derive from the ob-
jects: “The sublime must always be great, the beautiful can also 
be small. The sublime must be simple, the beautiful can be pol-
ished and delicate.“15 The Observations are so closely indebted to 
Burke’s theory of aesthetics that Kant’s criticism of Burke in the 
third Critique amounts to an indirect criticism of Kant’s own pre-
vious understanding of aesthetics. In the Critique of the Power of 
Judgement Kant calls Burke’s aesthetics “a mere empirical exposi-
tion of the sublime and of beauty.”16 According to Kant’s mature 
judgement Burke should be admired for his psychological preci-
sion in the descriptions. But if the analysis remains on the em-
pirical surface it can only be of use for empirical anthropology. 
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This would imply that Kant in the first Critique was right to ex-
pel aesthetics as a philosophy about judgements of taste from the 
principles of reason. Kant concludes the assessment of Burke by 
pointing out:
“If, however, we place the satisfaction in the object altogether in 
the fact that it gratifies us by stirring or alluring, we must not 
assume that any other man agrees with the aesthetic judgement 
which we pass; for as to these each one rightly consults his own 
individual sensibility. But in that case all censorship of taste 
would disappear, except indeed the example afforded by the ac-
cidental agreement of others in their judgements were regarded 
as commanding our assent.”17
Without explicitly mentioning his own pre-critical undertakings 
within the field of aesthetics Kant clearly dissociates himself from 
his former view. A very palpable result of Kant’s determined dis-
tance from his own efforts in philosophy before 1781 is the fact that 
he did not possess any of his pre-critical publications.18 Therefore, 
it is a lucky coincidence that Kant’s personal exemplar of the 
Observations on the Feeling of Beauty and of the Sublime has been 
preserved. In the years following the publication Kant used it as a 
place to draft new ideas and thoughts on blank pages copied into 
the book.19 Though the comments are not a break with the text 
they underline the important influence Kant got from his readings 
of Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the 1760’s. In the private comments 
Kant exclaims that “Rousseau has put me straight.”20 He further 
states that reading Rousseau’s philosophy taught him to value the 
dignity and rights of humanity regardless of the social and educa-
tional status of the individual. Before being put straight by reading 
Rousseau, Kant thought only research “could do honour to human-
ity and I despised the mass who knows nothing.”
In the 1760’s Kant connected taste with sociability and beau-
ty while virtue belonged to the solemn thinker stirred by the sub-
lime.21 In the published text as well as in his private comments Kant 
clearly attached greater importance to the sublime. In 1790 as Kant 
reassumed the discussion of aesthetics in the Critique of the Power 
of Judgement he thoroughly reworked the analysis of aesthetics as 
well as the importance of beauty. The question is why he changed 
his mind about aesthetics? Why did Kant, who as late as in the 
Critique of Pure Reason rejected that judgements of taste could be 
anything more than subjective feelings write a third Critique claim-
ing that aesthetic judgements of beauty and the sublime involve a 
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specific way of cognising ourselves and our world so that they also 
make up a part of the transcendental examination of the capacities 
of the mind?
THE REVOLUTION IN THE UNDERSTANDING OF AESTHETICS
One possible answer maintains Kant was rethinking his conception 
of aesthetics in order to counter the developments within contem-
porary German art and intellectual thought. According to such a 
view the enormous influence of the writers of Sturm und Drang in 
German literature gave way to a new emotionality, which Kant per-
ceived to be a threat to his transcendental philosophy. This is ar-
gued by John Zammito: 
“The contextual origins of the Critique of Judgement lie in the 
problematic concern of Immanuel Kant to drive the forces of 
the Sturm und Drang from their prominence in German intel-
lectual life in the 1780s and to establish the complete hegemony 
of the Aufklärung, the mantle of whose leadership had fallen to 
him with the deaths of Gotthold Lessing (1780) and then Moses 
Mendelssohn (1786). … As its leader, Kant felt compelled to re-
buff the ‘excesses’ of the rival Sturm und Drang movement. … 
the Sturm und Drang paraded its claims to privileged insight as 
the inspiration of ‘genius.’ This Kant could abide neither per-
sonally nor philosophically.”22
According to Zammito Kant understood himself as taking part in 
a battle between rivalling intellectual schools and as such want-
ed to dam up for the emotionality flooding the public in novels 
such as Goethe’s The Sorrows of Young Werther from 1774.23 The 
psychological basis of the argument lives off a portrait of Kant as 
prompted to reconsider his views on aesthetics by his “hostility to 
the Sturm und Drang.”24 As we have seen, Kant expelled aesthet-
ics as judgements of taste from transcendental philosophy in the 
first Critique. However, Zammito argues that the battle between 
the schools caused Kant to include such aesthetics in his tran-
scendental philosophy. Zammito does not take into account that 
Kant continuously from 1764 until 1790 had equalled judgements 
of taste with subjective empirical feelings that could not be given 
any grounding in the principles of reason. On Zammito’s account 
the main reason for Kant to include aesthetics in his third Critique 
rests on Kant’s wish to rescue his fellow citizens from being stirred 
by the emotionality of the Sturm und Drang. His means to aid the 
public would be his transcendental analysis of the beautiful which 
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could prove that these emotions – if they were nothing but stirring 
and alluring – were simply expression of the agreeable and not an 
experience of beauty and therefore only empirical generalizations. 
From my point of view, it seems highly improbable that Kant 
should be able to dam up the emotionality of the Sturm und Drang 
by way of his complex and intricate discussion of the subjective 
universal validity of pure judgements of taste. It is possible to ar-
gue that Kant’s preoccupation with expelling Rührung and Reiz 
– that is emotional stirring and alluring – from the judgement of 
taste was a way to counter the emotionality of the Sturm und Drang. 
Nevertheless, to judge Kant’s differentiation between the feeling 
of pleasure in judgements of beauty from the agreeable aroused 
by emotions to be founded in a hostility towards Sturm und Drang 
seems a strange and implausible psychological explanation. I 
would therefore opt for another account. 
In his handwritten comments to the Observations Kant, as already 
pointed out, frequently mentioned Rousseau as a major source of 
influence. He took interest in Rousseau as a moral and political 
philosopher. Besides setting Kant straight with regard to esteem-
ing the rights of humanity in all human beings, Kant also praised 
Rousseau for having discovered the “deeply hidden nature of [the 
plurality of human shapes] and the hidden law according to which 
providence would be justified.”25 As early as the mid 1760’s Kant 
believed Rousseau had revealed how the developing human cul-
ture was a source of human misery26 all the while he also had prov-
en that humanity could escape its self-imposed misery. Rousseau 
did not think that the advancements of society had made human 
beings happy or independent but rather dependent and miserable. 
But the unjust society could be made just if established upon a so-
cial contract between all. It seems that Kant as early as the 1760’s 
believed Rousseau’s arguments for a social contract to found the 
just society and the pedagogical ideas in Emile had torn off the 
cultural masks of human nature and shown humanity itself to be 
both the course of the sufferings in society and the key to the solu-
tion. From Rousseau Kant learned culture critique as is evident in 
the comments to the Observations. An illuminating example here-
of is Kant’s claim:
 
“In a society that functions according to fashion I should solely 
view everybody else as egoistic and thus I should not praise an-
ybody present or absent – rather in order for my conversation to 
become interesting I should either joke or mock.”27
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In the Observations Kant had taken in the British part of the dis-
cussion of aesthetics whereas the French Rousseauian part of the 
discussion is relegated to the private comments. With a sensual-
istic theory of aesthetics, it was impossible to say anything quali-
fied about the moral problems of the aestheticisation of society. If 
Kant wanted to confront the problems raised by Rousseau a new 
and transcendental take on aesthetic judgements was needed. This 
was exactly what Kant did in the third Critique. By means of the dif-
ferentiation between the pure judgement of natural beauty and the 
judgements of art, Kant could point out how we humans at one and 
the same time can be the cause of insincere assessments of each 
other as modish or dreary and contain the resources to judge and 
act morally. The transcendental justification of the judgements of 
taste enabled Kant to argue that it is possible for humanity to steer 
between the self-imposed aesthetic norms which often – but not al-
ways – make virtuosi in judging the beauty of art “vain, capricious, 
and addicted to injurious passions”28 while “on the other hand, … 
to take an immediate interest in the beauty of nature (not merely to 
have taste in estimating it) is always a mark of a good soul; and that, 
where this interest is habitual, it is at least indicative of a temper of 
mind favourable to the moral feeling that it should readily associ-
ate itself with the contemplation of nature.”29
On this account Kant changed his opinion on the question of 
aesthetic judgements in order to disentangle and develop further 
the intricate bonds between taste and his critical conception of mo-
rality. In the third Critique Kant isolated a pure judgement of taste 
in order to set the genuine judgements of taste apart from empirical 
and social developed tastes. Kant developed a theory of judgement 
of taste in which it is possible to differentiate between empirical 
and transcendental judgements. According to Kant’s mature view 
the empirical development of taste can be reduced to the shimmer 
of fashion and contains little relevance for transcendental reason-
ing. The empirical judgements of taste aptly supply resentment in 
culture. The transcendental judgement of taste, conversely, is a me-
dium of communication expanding, developing and preparing the 
reflective practice of judgement. Importantly the pure judgement 
of taste is a singular judgement on grounds of the sensation of the 
object. Thus, aesthetic judgements can never be general. It is the 
singular experience of the object, which constitutes the condition 
of possibility for any aesthetic judgements. We need to experience 
nature and artworks in order judge aesthetically. 
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THE PURE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE AND FREE BEAUTY
According to Kant the pure judgements of taste concern free beau-
ty. But often our judgements relate to dependent beauty that simply 
stirs or allures us. The difference between the aesthetic judgements 
relating to social esteem and the pure aesthetic judgements con-
cerned with the reflective power of judgement and the feeling of in-
tellectual pleasure is also associated to the object of the aesthetic 
judgement. Free beauty does not presuppose any concept whereas 
dependent beauty is deemed beautiful conditional to the perfection 
of the object and thus conditional to the concept of perfection of 
the object.For example a rose is beautiful regardless of its organ-
ic perfection as a flower that enables the plant to set seeds and thus 
reproduce itself. But a chandelier is beautiful dependent upon its 
perfection and grace as a chandelier. The differentiation concerns 
the way the mind is affected by the aesthetic object. 
Kant defines free beauty with the Latin concept “Pulchritudo 
vaga.”30 It is a remarkable translation of free beauty since vaga is 
not the translation of ‘free’. A straight Latin translation of the ad-
jective free would be ‘liber’. ‘Vaga’ means undecided or wander-
ing. Kant deliberately defines free beauty in Latin as an undecided 
or wandering beauty. Through the Latin translation, pulchritudo 
vaga, Kant induces the alert reader to ask herself what good rea-
sons there could be to point out that a key feature of free beauty is 
its undecidedness or wandering character. As follows he hints at an 
important aspect of free beauty. 
In defining free beauty, Kant is not referring to the properties 
of the object but rather to how the human mind responds to the ob-
ject. The mind commences to wander as the imagination is unde-
cided with regard to what concept can capture the experience of 
beauty in the object. This is not the case with dependent beauty – 
we can explain why a chandelier is an especially beautiful chande-
lier with reference to the definition of chandeliers. The beauty of a 
rose is not dependent upon it being a rose or even a flower. It is free 
from all conceptual definition of its “floweriness.” As a result, the 
mind wanders. It does not accept the proposed concepts of the un-
derstanding as adequate encapsulations of the aesthetic experience. 
The experience of free beauty expands the capacities of the mind 
whereas the experience of dependent beauty (pulchritudo adhaer-
ens) lingers on the allurement of emotions in the subject. In the ex-
perience of free beauty, the imagination and the understanding are 
animated in the free play, which Kant considers to be correlated to 
the transcendental feeling of pleasure.
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ART AND BEAUTY
Objects of art are, Kant emphasises, objects produced with a pur-
pose by a human being. As such art can either be mechanical or aes-
thetic.31 All art created for the purpose of realising the cognition 
of how to produce the thing is mechanical. The chandelier is me-
chanical art because the silversmith formed the silver with the pur-
pose of creating a chandelier. The silversmith had as her purpose 
to realise the thought idea of a thing, which can function as a con-
tainer supporting burning candles. Aesthetic, on the other hand, is 
all art, which has the feeling of pleasure as its immediate purpose. 
This implies that it is not possible to point out what was the ex-
act purpose of the creative process. There can be many ways to ac-
complish the purpose of arousing a feeling of pleasure and art can 
either be agreeable or beautiful. The agreeable art stimulates the 
observer’s feelings of sensational pleasure. In beautiful art, the rep-
resentations of the object convoy feelings of cognitive pleasure in 
the observer. The feeling of pleasure originates from the free play 
between the imagination and the understanding produced in the 
observer contemplating the artwork. 
By way of this definition of aesthetic art Kant indicates a dou-
ble character. Either art can be a medium staging human fashion 
and social stratification or it can be a vehicle for expansion of the 
communication and intellectual comprehension of art itself and its 
purpose. Clearly Kant thinks art can be beautiful in a similar man-
ner as the free natural beauty if it is aesthetically beautiful. At the 
same time, he underlines that not all aesthetic art functions anal-
ogously with natural beauty. If it is aesthetically agreeable art it is 
not comparable to natural beauty. It is evident with regard to beau-
ty in art, just as is the case with natural beauty, that the attitude of 
the observer and the quality of the object make up the deciding as-
pects as we judge some artwork or object of nature to be beautiful. 
The important difference between the object of nature and of art is 
that we cannot point to a purposeful creator of nature but must al-
ways expect a purposeful creator of art. This gives nature its sim-
plicity and art its complex social meaning.
The aesthetic ideas make up the aesthetic medium in which the 
production of beautiful artworks can take place.32 This implies 
that the subject having an aesthetic experience of a beautiful art-
work is aware of the object as art and thus aware of the purposeful 
creation of the object. But the judgements of taste cannot exhaust 
the object. Kant explains that “by an aesthetic idea I mean that 
representation of the imagination which induces much thought, 
yet without the possibility of any definite thought whatever, i.e., 
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concept, being adequate to it, and which language, consequent-
ly, can never get quite on level terms with or render completely 
intelligible.”33 There is no definite interpretation ready at hand. 
Artworks without a powerful aesthetic idea can be exhausted as 
their aesthetic value is created by allurement (Reiz) and thus de-
pends upon being agreeable. Artworks with strong aesthetic ideas 
overflow with a manifold of images and concepts so that no expres-
sion can be found which would encompass the whole of the experi-
ence of the work. The free play of the mind strives to find adequate 
descriptions. Whenever a concept is proposed in communication 
about the artwork it only opens up for even more un-thought of 
and un-named concepts and parts of the work. In the judgement of 
beautiful art, we request others to see and experience the same as 
us. Thereby our conversation about the artwork is a conversation, 
which expands our concepts by way of the wandering imagination – 
it wanders not only in the sensational experience or the conceptual 
knowledge but also in our personal life experience and our hopes 
and fears of the future.
THE ABILITY TO THINK FOR ONESELF
To explain how beautiful artworks can be created Kant points out 
two aspects. The artist should have genius and taste. Genius is a 
gift of nature. It enables the artist to expand her imagination to de-
velop ever new aesthetic ideas. This spirit rousing the imagination 
of the genius as an “animating principle of the mind”34 must be kept 
in check within the artist by her taste. Taste amounts to the reflec-
tive judgement of the creations of genius. While the genius freely 
creates aesthetic ideas that overflow with meaning the artist’s taste 
keeps these ideas within limits. Kant clearly gives prominence to 
taste over genius. Whereas genius can create an art which may be 
“said to be full of spirit”35 it is on account of taste art “deserves to be 
called beautiful art.” If the genius is not kept in “conformity of the 
law of the understanding” the “abundance and originality of Ideas” 
of the genius “produces in lawless freedom nothing but nonsense.” 
Thus, according to Kant the beautiful artwork is not only a distrac-
tion for the wandering mind. The free flow of ideas is limited by 
the taste of the artist. The judgement of taste “brings clearness and 
order into the multitude of thoughts, it makes the [aesthetic] ideas 
susceptible of being permanently and, at the same time, universal-
ly assented to, and capable of being followed by others, and of an 
ever-progressive culture.”
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The observer of art should meet an artwork with traits that will 
be universally assented to if the artwork is to be judged beauti-
ful. If art is merely or primarily a distraction its main service will 
be to satisfy the subject’s relentless craving after ever new distrac-
tions in order to expel the ensuing discontentment of the unstirred 
mind.36 The aesthetic stance towards life can therefore – as Kant 
had learned from Rousseau – be a distraction from living a morally 
justified life in accordance to valid values. But if art and the judge-
ments of taste are related to the higher purpose of “an ever-pro-
gressive culture,” Kant believes art can be a gateway to important 
discussions about fundamental values and perspective on our com-
mon living. The transcendental judgement of taste points to the 
enhancement of our common communication about how to lead 
our lives. Therefore, a standard of beautiful art is that it should be 
“brought into more or less close combination with moral Ideas…”37 
Important for art as beautiful and not merely “full of spirit” is the 
discussion of moral ideas. Since art can only hint at moral ideas 
and does not contain a specific and definite definition of these the 
judgements of taste uttered in relation to a beautiful artwork do not 
settle any moral question but open perspectives of what kind of be-
ings we are and what our cultural aims are. 
A significant result of Kant’s discussions of art in comparison to 
natural beauty is that the appreciation of natural beauty can shape 
the individual mind to a more profound susceptibility to moral 
judgements whereas there is no straight forward tie to a moral per-
sonality through the admiration of artificial artworks. We may at-
tribute to the lover of natural beauty “a beautiful soul, to which no 
connoisseur or lover [of art] can lay claim on account of the interest 
he takes in his [artistic] objects.”38 Nevertheless, exactly the arti-
ficiality of artworks and the complexity and ambiguity of the so-
cial world which we humans have created ourselves are addressed 
in the beautiful artworks. The discussions of art can give rise to 
a social space for thinking and judging about the direction of our 
culture. The representations of a beautiful artwork are aesthetical 
ideas regarding the shared culture and therefore open up a conver-
sation about our shared conditions of living and our hopes for the 
development of our common culture.   
The space in which we apply judgement of taste to beautiful 
art has central traits in common with Kant’s pre-critical descrip-
tion of teaching philosophy. In 1765, Kant highlighted the want of 
a well-established discipline of scientific philosophy and the con-
sequence, namely that it is not possible to teach philosophy as a 
science with a clear body of scientific results for the students to 
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memorise. The primary aim of the teacher of philosophy should 
therefore be to teach students “to philosophise.”39 Students should 
be taught how “to think about things yourself and to judge for 
yourself.” As Kant in 1790 introduced the aesthetic judgements of 
beauty into the system of transcendental philosophy he believed 
transcendental philosophy to be a true doctrine of philosophy. In 
Kant’s mature view transcendental philosophy can be taught as the 
science of philosophy. However, within this science the aesthetic 
judgements turn up as part of the system without the characteris-
tics of a science. The reflective judgements of beauty have a “sub-
jective universal validity”40 which is akin to Kant’s understanding 
in 1765 of philosophy. 
To learn to philosophise – according to Kant in 1765 – amount-
ed to learning to think and judge for one self. In the third Critique 
Kant designates this ability to the judgements of taste. Underlying 
the pure judgements of taste is the faculty of the sensus communis. 
It includes “a faculty of judgement, which in its reflection takes ac-
count (a priori) of the mode of representation of all other men in 
thought; in order as it were to compare its judgement with the col-
lective reason of humanity, and thus to escape the illusion arising 
from the private conditions that could so easily be taken for objec-
tive.”41 The important common trait between Kant understanding 
in 1765 and in 1790 is the underscoring of the importance of hu-
man free thinking. In the maxims of the sensus communis Kant un-
derlines this as he states that the human understanding is based on 
the maxims “1. to think for oneself” and “3. always to think con-
sistently.” The second maxim, “2. to put ourselves in thought in 
the place of every one else” points to a social limitation to the free 
thinking and is an advancement compared to Kant’s understanding 
of how to philosophise in 1765. In the third Critique Kant empha-
sises how the free thinking of each of us needs to be directed to the 
equal free thinking of any other in order to develop harmonically. 
Thus, in the third Critique Kant took Rousseau’s proclamation 
of culture critique seriously. With the possibility of pure judge-
ments of taste concerning nature as well as beautiful art Kant ar-
gued that within the human species is enclosed the conditions of 
possibility for developing a culture which is morally justified. But 
it is up to each individual to differentiate between the consumption 
of art and beautiful nature as a means to improve social status and 
the engagement in communication of the experience of beauty as a 
world-opening discourse.
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